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The Legal Philosophy of John Marshall
Harlan: Freedom of Expression,
Due Process, and Judicial Self-Restraint
Douglas A. Poe*
Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws,
it is he who is truly the lawgiver, to all intents and purposes, and not the
person who first spoke or wrote them.1
One of the current notions that holds subtle capacity for serious mischief
is a view of the judicial function that seems increasingly coming into vogue.
This is that all deficiencies in our society which have failed of correction
by other means should find a cure in the courts .... [S]ome well-meaning
people believe that the judicial rather than the political process is more
likely to breed better solutions of pressing or thorny problems. This is a
compliment to the judiciary but untrue to democratic principle.2
One of the greatest and most significant constitutional enigmas
with which the Supreme Court has grappled during the past two
decades has concerned the proper delineation of the first amendment's
prohibition against the abridgment of "the freedom of speech." The
range of problems confronted has extended from congressional investi-
gations3 to state obscenity laws,4 from sit-in demonstrations5 to the
provision of legal counsel by labor unions for their members. 6 An all-
encompassing and consistent theory of the first and fourteenth amend-
ments has yet to be articulated by the Court, a situation which is
hardly unexpected in view of the disparate claims asserted under the
* Member, Illinois Bar, B.A., DePauw University, 1964; LL.B., Duke University
School of Law, 1967; LL.M., Yale University School of Law, 1968.
1. Bishop Hoadly's Sermon preached before King George I, March 31, 1717.
2. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Function in Balance,
49 A.B.A.J. 943, 943-44 (1963).
3. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
4. See, e.g., Mishkin v. New York, 303 U.S. 502 (1966); A book named "John
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966);
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
5. See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373
U.S. 267 (1963); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Garner v.
Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
6. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967);
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
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constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and the closely re-
lated freedoms of expression, association, and assembly.7
The attempt here will not be to chart the course which the Court
has pursued through the muddied waters of the first amendment, but
rather to detail the approach of one member of the present Court,
John Marshall Harlan, to certain basic first and fourteenth amend-
ment problems. The justifications for concentration upon Harlan's
theories are several. In the first instance, Mr. Justice Harlan is cur-
rently an articulate spokesman for that prominent trend in American
judicial philosophy which is popularly termed "judicial self-restraint."8
Nevertheless, Harlan's views have not been subjected to systematic
exposition and criticism as have those, for example, of Mr. justice
Black.9 Secondly, Justice Harlan's theories are of interest not only
because he has frequently spoken for the Court,10 but, more significant-
ly, because he has at times taken a position far more advanced than
that which the majority was willing to adopt" and, upon other oc-
casions, has criticized severely other members of the Court for un-
warranted activism.'2 Finally, Justice Harlan's opinions are frequently
rich in theoretical legal analysis, a fact which has provoked the
7. The term "speech" will be used generically to designate the various interests
which the Court has deemed to be protected by the emanations of the "freedom of
speech" clause of the first amendment. These interests are frequently described by
such rubrics as "freedom of association" and "freedom of expression." See, e.g.,
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 185, 201-04 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring in
the result); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-63 (1958) (Harlan, J.).
8. See generally, L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIcHTS (1958); W. MENDELSON, JUSTICES
BLAcX AN FRA 'TuEa: CoNFIcT IN m CoUrT (1961); Thayer, The Origin and
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HAnv. L. REv. 129 (1893).
9. See generally, Ash, The Growth of Justice Black's Philosophy of Freedom of
Speech: 1962-66, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 840; C. L. Black, Jr., Mr. Justice Black, the
Supreme Court, and the Bill of Rights in THE OccAsIoNs OF JUSTICE 89 (1963);
Black & Cahn, Justice Black and the First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Inter-
view, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 549 (1962); Freund, Mr. Justice Black and the Judicial
Function, 14 U.C.L.A. L. RPEv. 467 (1967); Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice
Black on the First Amendment, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 428 (1967); Krislov, Mr. Justice
Black Reopens the Free Speech Debate, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 189 (1964).
10. E.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
11. See Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 185 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring in the
result); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
12. See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 47 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan's varying positions in
relation to other Justices points up the difficulty, if indeed not the futility, of assigning
labels, such as "liberal" and "conservative," to members of the Court. See also Ash,
supra note 9, at 850-51.
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criticism that he presents a dizzying array of barely manageable doc-
trine.1
3
One caveat is in order before proceeding with the discussion: there
does not appear in any Harlan opinion, series of opinions, or extra-
judicial pronouncements, a consistent and concisely stated theory of
the first amendment in relation to both the state and federal govern-
ments. Various elements must be drawn from a broad range of
sources. Among the consequences produced by this circumstance are
certain gaps, which must be filled by surmise and speculation.14
Additionally, when dealing with materials drawn from disparate
sources, one must resist the impression that Harlan would necessarily
transport every specific element of a particular analysis into every
other aspect of first amendment litigation.'5 In short, we must not be
hasty in imposing an overall system upon Harlan's thought, if indeed
inquiry should lead to the conclusion that no such system is intended.
I. GENERAL PHILOsoPY
Before commencing a more particularistic elaboration of Justice
Harlan's views concerning the scope of, and interrelation between,
the first and fourteenth amendments, it may be useful to emphasize
certain aspects of his overall conception of the function of the judicial
process in the American governmental system. The reason for this
preliminary excursus is that certain fundamental notions relating to
federalism, separation of powers, and the primacy of the political
(as opposed to the judicial) process permeate and underpin justice
Harlan's opinions in the first and fourteenth amendment areas.
Mr. justice Harlan stands squarely in the tradition of those scholars
and judges-pre-eminently James B. Thayer, Felix Frankfurter, and
Learned Hand-who emphasized the deference which, as a matter of
democratic principle, the judiciary should manifest toward judgments
of the political branches, particularly the legislature.' 6 Even in the
case of a statute "manifestly unwise, harsh or out-of-date," Harlan
has protested against the utilization of the power of judicial review
as an instrument of legislative revision. Such a procedure, he has
stated, would lead to:
a substantial transfer of legislative power to the courts. A function more
13. See Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and
Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 267, 296-303; Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of
Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 22-26.
14. See generally notes 73-91, 99-125, 169, 175-78, 183-84 infra and accompanying
text.
15. See generally, e.g., notes 73-91 infra and accompanying text.
16. See generally authorities cited note 8 supra.
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ill-suited to judges can hardly be imagined, situated as they are, and should
be, aloof from the political arena and beholden to no one for their consci-
entious conduct. Such a course would also denigrate the legislative process,
since it would tend to relieve legislators from having to account to the
electorate. The outcome would inevitably be a lessening, on the one hand,
of judicial independence and, on the other, of legislative responsibility, thus
polluting the blood stream of our system of government. 17
Closely integrated with the notion of deference to the legislative
judgment is the theory that the political processes, in the form of a
bifurcated federal system, afford the best safeguard for the protection
of individual liberty. Thus, in Harlan's view the framers of the
Constitution relied:
not primarily upon declarations of individual rights [specifically, the Bill
of Rights] but upon the kind of goverment the Union was to have. And
they determined that in a government of divided powers lay the best
promise for realizing the free society it was their object to achieve.18
Another important ramification of the federal structure, in Harlan's
view, is the progress anticipated from the broad freedom of experi-
mentation retained by the states in the social and economic spheres.19
If the notion that Supreme Court Justices are to serve as Platonic
Guardians2 of liberty is firmly rejected, then the question arises as
17. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the judicial Function in Balance,
49 A.B.A.J. 943, 944 (1963). Compare J. RocHE, COURTS AND EIGHTS: Tim AMEICAN
Junicmnmy iN AcTioN 121-23 (2d ed. 1966): ". . . [Tihere is no sound justification
for judicial policy-making. Essentially it is a Platonic graft on the democratic process
-a group of wise men insulated from the people have the task of injecting truth serum
into the body politic, of acting as an institutional chaperone to insure that the
sovereign populace and its elected representative do not act unwisely.
"In other words, one is free to reject the democratic premise that the people,
through their elected spokesman, are capable of self-government, but he should be
aware of his 6litism and its implications ...
"The judiciary rightfully has a strong and vital role to play in society: to insure
that the 'principles of natural justice' are enforced in litigation, that citizens are not
victimized by arbitrary and capricious government procedures, and, of course, that
appropriate legal norms are applied in litigation between private parties. But it is
not the function of judges to determine social and economic policy: their task is to
apply those policies decided upon by the responsible organs of government to cases at
bar."
18. Harlan, The Bill of Rights and the Constitution, 50 A.B.A.J. 918, 920 (1964).
19. See Harlan, supra note 17, at 944. Compare New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting): "To stay experimentation in
things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment
may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy inci-
dents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country."
20. The phrase is Learned Hand's. L. HAND, supra note 8, at 73. We may note
in passing that even Justice Black has been known in recent years to quote Judge
( VOL. 21
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to the proper role of the judiciary in regard to the preservation of
individual rights. Preliminarily, Justice Harlan would emphasize the
necessity for the application of neutral principles of constitutional
law 21 which would fully preserve and promote the vitality of the
federal system.22 It is to be expected, therefore, that constitutional
limitations upon the state and national governments will not be de-
lineated in the same manner.P Nor can the limits of governmental
power be defined without reference to the interest or power of the
particular governmental unit, whether state or federal, in the regula-
tion of the specific activity under consideration.2 Furthermore, while
the federal government is limited by the specific dictates of the Bill
of Rights, Justice Harlan considers the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to be doctrinally independent of the first eight
amendments, requiring, in the procedural phase, "fundamental fair-
ness"25 and, substantively, "a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints."2
Finally, it is pertinent to inquire whether Justice Harlan would
recognize any interests or "preferred freedoms" which the judiciary
should be particularly energetic to protectY. Mr. Justice Harlan has
Hand's admonitions concerning judicial self-restraint. E.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514, 537 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
21. "Our scheme of ordered liberty is based, like the common law, on enlightened
and uniformly applied legal principle, not on ad hoc notions of what is right or wrong
in a particular case." Harlan, supra note 17, at 944; see Harlan, supra note 18, at 920.
See also A. BiCxEL, ThE LEAST DANGERous BRANcH 49-65 (1962); Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HIARv. L. REv. 1 (1959).
2. "These doctrines [federalism and separation of powers] lie at the root of our
constitutional system. It is manifest that no view of the Bill of Rights or interpreta-
tion of any of its provisions which fails to take due account of them can be considered
constitutionally sound." Harlan, supra note 18, at 920.
23. "[Olur federalism not only tolerates, but encourages, differences between federal
and state protection of individual rights, so long as the differing policies alike are
founded in reason and do not run afoul of dictates of fundamental fairness." Id.
24. "Whether a particular limitation on speech or press is to be upheld because it
subserves a paramount governmental interest must, to a large extent, I think, depend
on whether that government has, under the Constitution, a' direct substantive interest,
that is, the power to act, in the particular area involved." Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 504 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
25. E.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 616 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
26. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added). Justice Harlan has also indicated that procedural issues should be more
closely scrutinized by the courts on the theory that "these are questions which the
Constitution has entrusted at least in part to courts, and upon which courts have
been understood to possess particular competence." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 70 (1967)
(separate opinion of Harlan, J.). It is somewhat paradoxical, however, that some of
Justice Harlan's broadest opinions have concerned substantive rights, while he has
almost consistently dissented to the application of new procedural limitations upon the
states. Compare cases cited note 11 supra with cases cited note 12 supra.
27. It may be noted in passing that even Judge Learned Hand, hardly an advocate
of far-reaching judicial review, conceded that issues involving the freedom of speech
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noted that "certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of
the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment '28 and that when
dealing with "what must be considered 'a basic liberty' 2 9 the ordi-
nary presumption of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment
is inapplicable.30 However, since the due process concept of the four-
teenth amendment "stands . . . on its own bottom,"3' 1 separate and
apart from the Bill of Rights, there is no mechanical litmus test to
designate "those rights 'which are.., fundamental; which belong...
to the citizens of all free governments.' "3
As to basic first amendment theory, one would not ordinarily charac-
terize Harlan's views as positing a preferred position for speech in all
contexts. 33 Certainly it is commonly believed that Justice Harlan
would not extend protection to speech in the penumbral areas of the
first amendment to the same extent as Justice Black.4 Rather, in
might require greater vigilence by the courts. He reasoned that "the most important
issues here arise when a majority of the voters are hostile, often bitterly hostile,
to the dissidents against whom the statute is directed; and legislatures are more likely
than courts to repress what ought to be free. It is true that the periods of passion
or panic are ordinarily not very long, and that they are usually succeeded by a
serener and more tolerant temper; but, as I have just said, serious damage may have
been done that cannot be undone, and no restriction is ordinarily possible for the
individuals who have suffered. This is a substantial and important advantage of
wide judicial review." L. HAND, supra note 8, at 69.
28. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 545.
30. See, id. See also United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938) (Stone, J.): "There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption
of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific pro-
hibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are
deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. . . . It is
unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is
to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. . . . [Citations
omitted.]"
31. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
32. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
33. But see NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (Harlan, J.); notes
93-125 and accompanying text, infra.
34. Compare, for example, the majority opinions by Justice Harlan in Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) and Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366
U.S. 36 (1961), with the dissents of Justice Black in both of these cases. This is not
to say that in all cases Justice Black would extend greater protection to "speech" than
would Justice Harlan. A major difficulty, of course, is the definition of the scope of the
term "speech." Justice Black adheres to sharp speech/conduct and direct-effect-upon-
speech/indirect-effect-upon-speech dichotomies. See Barenblatt v. United States, supra,
at 143-44 (Black, J., dissenting); Freund, supra note 9, at 471. See generally Ash, supra
note 9. Justice Harlan, on the other hand, has declined to impose such rigid distinctions.
See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 452-55 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Thus, in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961), Harlan was the only Justice who
specifically bottomed his opinion on the theory that a sit-in demonstration constituted
constitutionally protected "speech." See generally notes 126-134 infra: and accompanying
[ VOL. 21
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Harlan's view, it is frequently necessary to characterize the content
and status of the speech, the circumstances of its delivery, the govern-
ment which seeks to regulate the activity and its interest in the regu-
lation, and the degree to which the regulation actually impinges upon
or restricts the otherwise protected activity.3 Thus, only after a
multifaceted inquiry can the degree of protection for the activity be
more precisely defined. It is to the categorization of speech and the
relative protection afforded to each category that we will subse-
quently turn in Parts II and III.
II. TBE STANDARD OF PRoTEcrON: THE PROBLEM OF FEDERALISM-
"INcoRPoRATION" AND SUBSTANTIVE Du.E PRocEss
Before proceeding to Justice Harlan's view of the scope of pro-
tection in the speech area provided by the first and fourteenth amend-
ments, we must examine Harlan's notion of the interrelation between
these provisions. Initially, of course, Justice Harlan rejects as histori-
cally unsound the "incorporation" theory, which is so strenuously ad-
vocated by Mr. Justice Black-1 and which holds that section 1 of the
fourteenth amendment is precisely co-extensive with the first eight
amendments.37 In addition, Justice Harlan is the only member of
the present Court who explicitly rejects the notion of "selective in-
corporation," the process by which the Court has gradually, over a
period of time, extended various limitations of the Bill of Bights to
text. Mr. Justice Douglas also reached the constitutional issues in Garner, but his opinion
was bottomed on the notion that "a State may not constitutionally enforce a policy of
segregation in restaurant facilities." Of course, this comparison between the views of
Justices Harlan and Black must be qualified by the fact that in recent years the
Justices have frequently reached the same result, whether in dissent as in Brown v.
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966), or as members of the majority. E.g., Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). In this series of cases both Justice Harlan and Justice
Black opposed a latitudinarian interpretation of the first and fourteenth amendment
freedoms of speech, expression, and assembly.
35. See generally notes 73-178 and accompanying text, infra.
36. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
37. No small amount of judicial sleight of hand is necessary to make sense of the
"incorporation" notion. The doctrine has its genesis in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925), in which the Supreme Court for the first time "assumed" that the first
amendments guarantee of freedom of speech was also a limitation upon the states by
virtue of § 1 of the fourteenth amendment. The Gitlow Court, however, infatuated as
it was by the judicially-created dogma of "substantive due process," utilized the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment for this first act of "incorporation," and it
is the due process clause which has been rather consistently employed throughout
the subsequent evolution of "selective incorporation." See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (searches and
seizures); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (association); Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (freedom of religion); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308
U.S. 147 ((1939) (speech, press). See also Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213
(1967) (speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation and
1968 ]
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the states through the fourteenth amendment.38 Aside from the his-
torical evidence (itself persuasive if indeed not conclusively opposed
to both "incorporation" notions9), in the Harlan view the mere me-
chanical application of the first eight amendments to the states, to-
gether with the total body of federal law surrounding them,40 fails
utterly to take into account the fact that the powers and responsi-
bilities of the state and federal governments are not identical.41
cross-examination of witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (self-incrimina-
tion); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel and unusual punishment);
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment of religion). The
latter cases refer only to § 1 of the fourteenth amendment generally; however, there
is little indication that reliance is intended to be placed upon any other provision than
the due process clause.
38. It will be noted that "selective incorporation" describes a process of judicial
interpretation rather than a fullblown theory of constitutional doctrine. "Selective in-
corporation" is sometimes associated with Mr. Justice Brennan and apparently is
adhered to, or acquiesced in, by most of the members of the present Court. At
this juncture, the only significant provisions of the first eight amendments which have
not been applied to the states are the grand jury indictment and double jeopardy
sections of the fifth amendment and the requirement of a jury trial in civil cases in-
volving more than $20 imposed by the seventh amendment.
39. The use of the due process clause for "total incorporation" purposes is historical
nonsense. To the extent that the fourteenth amendment was intended to impose the
limitations of the Bill of Rights upon the states, it seems clear that the privileges and
immunities clause was the intended medium. See, e.g., Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L.
REv. 5 passim (1949); Comment, 42 N.C. L. REv. 925, 934-35 (1964). This distinc-
tion is not merely a case of excessive concern for historical niceties and legalistic fine.
points; in at least one respect the reach of the due process clause is obviously greater
than that of the privileges and immunities clause: the former extends protection to
"any person," while the latter is limited to "citizens of the United States." Of course,
aside from debating which clause of the fourteenth amendment was intended to
incorporate the Bill of Rights, many authorities deny that any incorporation was sought
to be achieved in the first place by the framers of the fourteenth amendment. See
Fairman, supra; HAmIs, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY 39-40 (1960); TEN BaoFc, THE
ANTisLAvExY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951); Graham The "Con-
spiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371 (1938); Comment,
42 N.C.L. REv. 925 (1964). But see 2 Caoss=Y, PoLrncs AND THE CONSTITUTION IN
=H HISToRY Or T=E UNrrED STATES 1083, 1119 (1953); FLAcx, THE ADOPTION OF
T'nS FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908). Whatever the conclusion as to the historical
validity of the "total incorporation" doctrine, it has been suggested that the notion
of "selective incorporation" is wholly lacking in a sound historical foundation. See
Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929,
934 (1965); Henkin, "Selective Incorporatiorn" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE
L.J. 74, 77-78 (1963).
Justices Black and Harlan renewed the battle over the historical legitimacy of the
"incorporation" doctrine in their concurring and dissenting opinions respectively in
Duncan v. Louisiana, 392 U.S. 947 (1968).
40. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 27 (1964).
41. "The powers and responsibilities of the state and federal governments are not
congruent; under our Constitution, they are not intended to be. Why should it be
thought, as an a priori matter, that limitations on the investigative power of the States
are in all respects identical with limitations on the investigative power of the Federal
Government?" (Harlan, J., dissenting); Compare Friendly, supra note 38, at 935-38,
953-56; Duncan v. Louisiana, 392 U.S. 947 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring).
[ VOL. 21
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Hence, the "creeping paralysis"42 of the "incorporation" doctrine is
condemned as placing the states in a constitutional strait jacket.43
Thus, while Justice Harlan has in recent years occasionally joined the
majority in reversing a conviction because particular procedural safe-
guards were deemed lacking,44 he has invariably and scrupulously
disassociated himself from a mechanical application of the first eight
amendments to the states.
45
If the Bill of Rights does not apply to the states through the medium
of the fourteenth amendment, then the reach of the due process
clause of that amendment remains to be determined. The most ex-
tensive elaboration by Mr. Justice Harlan of his concept of due process
in the procedural sphere is probably contained in his dissenting opinion
in Malloy v. Hogan.46 There Harlan emphasized that due process is
a manifestation of "the community's sense of justice" 47 the develop-
ment of which may gradually produce an "expansion of the protec-
tion which due process affords."48 Thus, it is important to note that
the Justice conceives of due process as an evolutionary rather than a
static concept. Furthermore, he considers the due process provision
of the fourteenth amendment to be conceptually independent of the
Bill of Rights and argued in Malloy that "while inclusion of a par-
ticular provision in the Bill of Rights might provide historical evi-
dence that the right involved was traditionally regarded as funda-
mental,"49 nevertheless the "Court's usual approach has been to
ground the prohibitions against state action squarely on due process,
without intermediate reliance on any of the first eight Amendments." 50
Therefore, Justice Harlan protested that the Court in Malloy had
failed to restrict its review of the challenged state action to its proper
scope, namely, "inquiring whether the proceedings below met the
demands of fundamental fairness which due process embodies."51
It will of course be noted that once the concept of due process is
42. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 616 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
43. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 45 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring); see Washing-
ton v. State of Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 24 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 46-51 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609, 616-17 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
408-09 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
44. E.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
45. See cases cited notes 43-44 supra.
46. 378 U.S. 1, 14 (1964).
47. Id. at 15.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 24.
51. Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
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severed from the specific requirements of the Bill of Rights, there is
no inherent reason why the due process guarantee might not be
extended beyond the protection which the first eight amendments af-
ford. 2 However, Justice Harlan has not demonstrated this theoretical
possibility in the criminal procedure area, largely because a majority
of the present Court has manifested virtually unrestrained enthusiasm
to impose strict procedural guarantees upon the states.53 Justice
Harlan has generally protested against this trend, occasionally ac-
quiescing or expressing his concurrence on independent due process
grounds.54 On the other hand, in areas other than criminal procedures,
Mr. Justice Harlan has established that his concept of substantive
due process provides a vehicle for the protection of individual rights
in instances not specifically covered by the Bill of Rights. The major
battleground in the substantive due process area has been in the
field of enforcement by the states of laws prohibiting the use of
contraceptive devices, and the dissemination of medical advice on
contraceptives. When the pertinent Connecticut statutes were chal-
lenged in Poe v. Ullman55 in 1961, the majority employed one of the
"passive virtues"O and dismissed the case on ripeness grounds. justice
Harlan wrote a vigorous dissent in which he rejected both the "in-
corporation" doctrine57 and the argument that the due process guaran-
tee was limited to procedural fairness.58
52. In Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), in which Justice Black articulated
his "incorporation" notion, Justices Murphy and Rutledge urged that the fourteenth
amendment not be limited to the Bill of Rights: "I agree that the specific guarantees
of the Bill of Rights should be carried over intact into the first section of the Four-
teenth Amendment. But I am not prepared to say that the latter is entirely and
necessarily limited by the Bill of Rights. Occasions may arise where a proceeding falls
so far short of conforming to fundamental standards of procedure as to warrant consti-
tutional condemnation in terms of a lack of due process despite the absence of a specific
provision in the Bill of Rights." 332 U.S. at 124 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added). Thus, Justices Murphy and Rutledge essentially would have combined the
Black and Harlan notions of due process into a single theory of the fourteenth
amendment.
53. See, e.g., cases cited notes 43-44 supra. See generally Friendly, supra note 38.
54. See, e.g., cases cited notes 43-44 supra.
55. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
56. See generally A. BicEr, supra note 21, at 143-56.
57. In addition to historical grounds concerning the intention of the fourteenth
amendment framers, Justice Harlan relied on the fact that both the fifth and the
fourteenth amendments contain identical due process clauses. This factor "suggests
that due process is a discrete concept which subsists as an independent guaranty of
liberty and procedural fairness, more general and inclusive than the specific prohibitions
[of the first eight amendments]." 367 U.S. at 542.
58. Id. at 540. Justice Harlan's argument for a substantive aspect to due process
is that without such a limitation governmental action could destroy liberty and property
entirely, assuming only that procedural fairness was employed. Presumably, the
argument is that possible deprivation through procedural fairness necessarily presup-
poses and requires the existence of life, liberty, and property, with respect to which
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In the Poe case, Justice Harlan conceded (or asserted) that due
process cannot be reduced to a single formula; rather, "it has rep-
resented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of
respect to the liberty of the individual, has struck between that lib-
erty and the demands of organized society." 9 In a formulation which
is clearly susceptible of a broad interpretation, Harlan noted that
"the full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
... includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary imposition and
purposeless restraints."60 Embracing the right of privacy notion ex-
pounded in Mr. Justice Brandeis' eloquent dissent in Olmstead v.
United States,61 Justice Harlan asserted that the Connecticut statutes
demanded "the intrusion of the whole machinery of the criminal law
into the very heart of marital privacy,"n which "by common under-
standing throughout the English-speaking world, must be granted to
be a most fundamental aspect of 'liberty,' the privacy of the home
in its most basic sense."6 Consequently, the Justice would have re-
versed the convictions, holding the anti-contraceptive statutes un-
constitutional as applied to married couples.
The same Connecticut statutes came under renewed attack in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut,64 although this time the opponents of the state
legislation mustered a decisive majority of the Court to their side.65
The thrust of Justice Harlan's concurring opinion attacked the po-
the procedures may be employed. "Thus the guaranties of due process, though having
their roots in Magna Carta's 'per legem terrae' and considered as procedural safeguards
'against executive usurpation and tyranny,' have in this country 'become bulwarks
against arbitrary legislation."' Id. at 541, quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,
532 (1884).
59. Id. at 542.
60. Id. at 543 (emphasis added). The formulation is repeated in Washington v.
State of Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 24 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), but it has not other-
wise surfaced or been extensively developed in other contexts.
61. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928), overruled by, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
62. 367 U.S. at 553.
63. Id. at 548. The notion of marital privacy is no doubt felt by many to consti-
tute "a most fundamental aspect of 'liberty.'" However, such a proposition is not
readily susceptible of extensive documentation. Thus, Justice Harlan's argument con-
tains little more than bare assertion. Mr. Justice Goldberg, who took a similar tack
in Grisworld v. Connecticut, was likewise plagued by a paucity of evidence to sustain
the position that there is a fundamental right of marital privacy recognized by the
English-speaking world.
64. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
65. Griswold produced a grand total of six opinions. Mr. Justice Douglas wrote
the opinion for the Court. Mr. Justice Goldberg wrote an opinion for himself, the
Chief Justice, and Mr. Justice Brennan in which he concurred in the opinion and
judgment of the Court. Justices White and Harlan each separately concurred in the
judgment of the Court. Justices Black and Stewart each wrote dissenting opinions, in
which the other joined.
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sition, implicit in the majority view and explicit in the dissents,66 that
the "incorporation" doctrine could properly be used to restrict the
reach of the fourteenth amendment.67 Thus, just as it was deemed
historically unsound to impose the full panoply of federal law sur-
rounding the first eight amendments upon the states, so also did
Justice Harlan consider it improper to limit the contours of the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause to the confines of the
first eight amendments.
In his dissent in Poe v. Ullman, Justice Harlan had anticipated
the charge that his approach to interpretation of the due process
clause would allow judges "to roam where unguided speculation might
take them."68 On the contrary, he insisted, judges are bound by the
historical traditions of the American governmental experience. Thus,
a decision of the Supreme Court "which radically departs from ...
[this tradition] could not long survive, while a decision which builds
on what has survived is likely to be sound."69 In Griswold, Justice
Harlan attacked the implication of the dissentse0 that "judicial self-
restraint" required that the due process clause be deemed co-extensive
with the "specific" provisions of the first eight amendments. He
noted that the "specific" provisions were no more effective than the
due process clause in restraining some members of the Court from
rendering "personar' interpretations to keep the Constitution in "tune
with the times."7' 1 The Justice concluded that judicial self-restraint
can be achieved:
66. See 381 U.S. at 481-84, 510-21 (Black, J., dissenting), 530-31 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
67. Id. at 500-01. Justice Goldberg agreed with Justice Harlan that § 1 of the
fourteenth amendment is not properly restricted to the contours of the Bill of Rights:
"Although I have not accepted the view that 'due process' as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates all of the first eight Amendments . . . .I do agree that the
concept of liberty protects those personal rights that are fundamental, and is not
confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Right." Id at 486.
68. 367 U.S. at 542.
69. Id. Compare Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J.): "The vague contours of the Due Process Clause do not leave judges at large.
We may not draw on our merely personal and private notions and disregard the
limits that bind judges in their judicial function. Even though the concept of due
process of law is not final and fixed, these limits are derived from considerations that
are fused in the whole nature of our judicial process. . . .These are considerations
deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling traditions of the legal profession."
70. 381 U.S. at 511-13, 519-27 (Black, J., dissenting), 530-31 (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing).
71. Id. at 501. It could hardly be asserted persuasively that the approach of Justices
Douglas or Goldberg would add significantly more certainty than the substantive due
process conceptions of Justice Harlan. Mr. Justice Douglas in his penumbral ap-
proach managed to combine haphazardly the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth
amendments, while Justice Goldberg blended the penumbral theory of the majority
and the substantive due process notion of Justice Harlan with a revivified ninth
amendment of uncertain scope. See 381 U.S. at 488-97. And one can hardly resist
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only by continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history, solid
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society, and wise appreci-
ation of the great roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation of
powers have played in establishing and preserving American freedoms.72
As we have seen, Justice Harlan would apply a less strict standard
to the states in the area of criminal procedure under the rubric of
"fundamental fairness," and in some circumstances, he would employ
a concept of substantive due process which would impose limitations
more extensive than those required by the Bill of Rights (strictly con-
strued without extensive penumbras). It is now necessary to focus
more closely upon the narrower question of the relation between four-
teenth amendment due process and the first amendment's guarantee
of the freedom of speech. The question may be posed in the follow-
ing form: Would Justice Harlan impose the first and fourteenth
amendments' limitations in the free speech area upon the federal
government and the states in precisely the same manner? Or, alterna-
tively stated, would the Justice accept the notion that at least the
first amendment is "incorporated" in the fourteenth? The short an-
swer to both queries is "no" with qualifications, but the ramifica-
tions of the Harlan doctrine are not simple to chart.
Initially, it should be noted that Justice Harlan has quoted with
approval the dictum of Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Gitlow v.
New York, 3 in which Justice Holmes intimated that divergent stan-
dards may be appropriate under the first and fourteenth amendments:
the observation that Justices Black and Stewart, in search of certainty in an un-
certain world, are pursuing an illusion to the extent that their view finds specificity in
the first eight amendments.
In addition, there are distinct overtones in Justice Stewart's dissent (see id. at 528),
echoed by the majority (see id. at 481-82), that the Harlan approach represented a
return to the bad old days when the Supreme Court invoked substantive due process
"to substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies,
who are elected to pass laws" (id. at 528, quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,
730 (1963). One possible retort is that Justices Black and Stewart both hold a concept
of substantive due process, which is given content through the "incorporation" theory.
Apart from the shaky historical rationale, there appears to be no reason why the scope
of a doctrine of substantive due process, if one insists upon having such a doctrine,
should be delineated by the Bill of Bights. Additionally, to the argument that a sub-
stantive due process dogma could be applied again in the strictly social and economic
areas to supervise state and federal legislation, the short answer is that no member of
the present Court has suggested such a course. If the question is why in Harlan's view
"fundamental individual liberties" are selected for special protection, then this is a
question which all of the Justices, hardly excluding Justice Black, must confront.
The answer is, I suppose, that respect for individual liberties is deeply rooted in our
"concept of ordered liberty" (Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)
(Cardozo, J.)), part of "what history teaches are the traditions" of the American po-
litical experience. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
72. 381 U.S. at 501.
73. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to
be included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has
been given to the word "liberty" as there used, although perhaps it may be
accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of interpretation than is allowed
to Congress by the sweeping language that governs or ought to govern the
laws of the United StatesY4
Since Justice Harlan quoted this passage in the course of a discussion
which attempted to demonstrate that the Supreme Court had tra-
ditionally distinguished sharply between the application of the Bill
of Bights and the fourteenth amendment, 5 it is at least plausible that
the Justice, as a matter of general theory, would define differently
the standards imposed by the first and fourteenth amendments in
the speech area.
However, it is only in the series of obscenity cases, commencing
with Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California,6 that Justice
Harlan has explored in any detail the theory that the fourteenth
amendment affords lesser protection to speech than does the first
amendment. It will be recalled that in Roth-Alberts the majority,
through Mr. Justice Brennan, developed a two-level theory, according
to which certain specified categories of speech are deemed to be
totally without the constitutional protection of the first amendment. 77
Justice Harlan, in his separate opinion, did not specifically address
himself to the majority's theory, but rather analyzed the cases in
terms of the differing ambits of the first and fourteenth amendments
and the divergent interests of the state and national governments in
the regulation of obscene materials. Thus, Justice Harlan denied that
the:
state and federal powers in this area are the same, and that just because
74. Id. at 672 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201,
208 (2d Cir. 1950) (L. Hand, J.).
75. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 25 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
76. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). See also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 704
(1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 515 (1966)
(Harlan, J., concurring); A book named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 455 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 203 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
77. "The dispositive question is whether obscenity is utterance within the area of
protected speech and press." 354 U.S. at 481. "'... There are certain well-defined
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and
obscene . . . . It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality .... .' [quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942) (Murphy, J.) (emphasis added)]. Id. at 485. "We hold that
obscenity is not with the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." Id.
(Brennan, J.).
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the State may suppress a particular utterance, it is automatically permis-
sible for the Federal Government to do the same. I agree with Mr. Justice
Jackson that the historical evidence does not bear out the claim that the
Fourteenth Amendment "incorporates" the First in any literal sense7
8
Noting that the federal government has "no substantive power over
sexual morality,"79 but only an incidental interest in obscene ma-
terials through the postal power, and that, on the other hand, the
states bore "direct responsibility for the protection of the local moral
fabric,"80 Justice Harlan concurred in the affirmance of the state
judgment of conviction in Alberts while dissenting to the federal con-
viction in Roth. Combining his analysis of the first and fourteenth
amendments and his discussion of the respective governmental inter-
ests, Justice Harlan concluded that "both the letter and spirit of the
First Amendment" 81 constitutionally limited the federal government
to regulation of the narrow area of "'hard-core' pornography," 2 while
state regulation would survive constitutional scrutiny unless it "so
subverts the fundamental liberties implicit in the Due Process Clause
that it cannot be sustained as a rational exercise of power."
8 3
If the theoretical framework were complete at this point, we would
have a basis for analyzing the reach of governmental power under the
first and fourteenth amendments, regardless of how difficult the appli-
cation of the due process rationality criterion might be in a particular
case.84 However, in other instances of free speech adjudication, Justice
Harlan has indicated that stricter limitations may be imposed upon
78. 354 U.S. at 503. Justice Harlan's citation is to Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250, 287 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting): "The assumption of other dissents (by
Douglas, Black, and Reed, JJ.] is that the 'liberty' which the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment protects against denial by the States is the literal and
identical 'freedom of speech or the press' which the First Amendment forbids only
Congress to abridge. The history of criminal libel in America convinces me that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not 'incorporate' the First, that the powers of Congress
and of the States over this subject are not of the same dimensions, and that because
Congress probably could not enact this law it does not follow that the States may
piot." Id. at 288. Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Jackson found the Illinois group libel
statute under attack to be constitutionally deficient because it failed to permit a jury
determination of various critical issues. Id. at 299-305.
79. 354 U.S. at 504.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 506.
82. Id. at 507.
83. Id. at 501. "From my standpoint, the Fourteenth Amendment requires of a
State only that it apply criteria rationally related to the accepted notion of obscenity
and that it reach results not wholly out of step with current American standards."
A book named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413, 458 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
84. The test on the federal level is not entirely clear, however, even as to its proper
formulation. See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT.
REv. 1, 24-25.
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the states.85 Furthermore, while not explicitly adopting the majority's
two-level theory of speech in his Roth-Alberts opinion, Justice Harlan
did state in his majority opinion in Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cali-
fornia that "certain forms of speech, or speech in certain contexts,
has been considered outside the scope of constitutional protection.""6
Finally, Justice Harlan has cited first amendment authority in cases
imposing limitations upon state action with the acknowledgment that
"[p]rinciples of free speech are carried to the States ... through the
Fourteenth Amendment."87
In an attempt to rationalize these various disparate elements, we
are left with the following solution: There are two broad classes of
speech, one of which is entitled to full constitutional protection (how-
ever that may be defined)88 against limitations imposed by either the
85. "The guarantees of freedom of speech and press were not designed to prevent
'the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of
which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems
absolutely essential .... ' 2 CooLEY, CONSTITUTJONAL LImrATiONS 886 (8th ed.) Our
touchstones are that acceptable limitations must not affect 'the impartial distribution
of news' and ideas, Associated Press v. Labor Board ... [301 U.S. 103, 133 (1937)],
nor because of their history or impact constitute a special burden on the press,
Grosjean v. American Press Co., Inc., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), nor deprive our free
society of the stimulating benefit of varied ideas because their purveyors fear physical
or economic retribution solely because of what they choose to think and publish."
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150-51 (1967) (plurality opinion of
Harlan, J.). See also, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-62 (1958).
86. 366 U.S. 36, 50 (1961). In support of the textual proposition, and as an indi-
cation of the classes of speech which Justice Harlan would presumably hold not en-
titled to constitutional protection, the following cases were cited: Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (conspiracy to cause insubordination in the military;
conspiracy to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service of the United States);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words;" also, in dictum,
obscenity, profanity, and libel); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)
(advocacy of the violent overthrow of the government); Beaubarnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952) (group libel); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (incite-
ment to the overthrow of the government by violence); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity). Justice Harlan's recognition of the two-level theory of
speech can also be gleaned from a comparison of his analysis of substantive due process
in Poe and Griswold and his approach to obscenity in Alberts v. California. In each
instance there was an admittedly legitimate state interest, broadly speaking, the preser-
vation of the moral fabric of the community. In Poe and Griswold the means adopted
to attain this end were held to collide with a fundamental right, broadly, a right to
privacy in the marital relationship. On the other hand, pursuing this same state interest
in Alberts, the state could completely suppress the composing and distributing of
obscene materials. Obviously, therefore, the latter activities could not constitute a
fundamental right. Any suggestion that Justice Harlan would exclude speech entirely
from his fundamental rights category ignores the opinions that he has written or con-
curred in which accord broad protection to speech. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (Brennan, J.); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157,
201-04 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring); supra note 85. The only conclusion is that
some forms of speech are entitled to greater protection than others.
87. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Harlan, J., concurring).
88. See generally notes 95-125 infra and accompanying text.
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state or the federal government, the other of which merits no special
constitutional protection. That is to say, the latter category is assimi-
lated to conduct and may be regulated by either the state or federal
government in the same manner that any other conduct may be
regulated, subject only to the general due process restriction against
arbitrary and capricious governmental actions.89 So much is more
or less orthodox thought.
There is, however, a third, intermediate category of speech which
is unique to Harlan's theories, in which divergent degrees of protec-
tion are afforded depending upon whether the regulation in question
was promulgated by the state or the federal government. This form
of speech may be said to be partially protected, at least to the extent
that regulation by the federal government is sharply limited. The
only example of a class of speech which has been placed explicitly
in this third category is obscenity, ° and it is in the delineation of
this third class of speech that Justice Harlan has definitely parted
company with his brethren on the present Court.91
89. See note 83 supra and accompanying text. The general due process prohibition
against arbitrary legislation is set out in such cases as Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934).
90. It is quite possible that if the occasion arose for extended analysis, Justice
Harlan would assimilate some of the classes of speech in the unprotected category
(see note 86 supra) into the third category which would allow greater regulation by
the states than by the federal government. It will be recalled that Mr. Justice Jackson
in his dissent in Beauharnais assumed that the federal government could not consti-
tutionally enact a group libel statute (note 78 supra). In addition, it would appear
that, since the states have the primary responsibility for maintaining order through
local law enforcement agencies, the states alone could punish such activity as the
"fighting words" in Chaplinsky.
The only remaining class of speech in Justice Harlan's catalogue of unprotected
activity (which, however, was not indicated to be exhaustive) is inciting advocacy of
the overthrow of the government. By a curious twist, this advocacy if directed toward
the federal government is punishable by the federal government alone, whereas if it
is directed against the state government it is punishable by either the state or the
federal government. Compare Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), with
Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959). This result was reached, however, by means
of statutory construction of the Smith Act and not through the imposition of a consti-
tutional command. Nevertheless, to the extent that surmise is possible, the only two
classes of speech which may be suppressed, in Justice Harlan's view, by either the
state or federal government are hard-core pornography and inciting advocacy of the
overthrow of the state government.
91. "It is too late in the day to argue that the location of the line is different, and
the task of ascertaining it easier, when a state rather than a federal obscenity law is
involved. The view that the constitutional guarantees of free expression do not
apply as fully to the States as they do to the Federal Government was rejected in
Roth-Alberts . . . , where the Court's single opinion applied the same standards to
both a state and a federal conviction." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187 n.2




III. ThE SCOPE OF PROTECTION: THE "BALANCING" PROBLEM
AND A CENTRAL CoRE OF ABSOLUTE PROTECTION
Thus far we have concentrated largely upon the standard of protec-
tion afforded to speech and related liberties and, more specifically,
upon the question whether identical constitutional limitations are im-
posed upon the state and federal governments. Heretofore the
analysis has been pursued by noting that implicit in Justice Harlan's
thought is the classification of the various forms of speech according
to their content as "protected," "unprotected," and "partially pro-
tected." The assumption has been that the governmental action in
issue was designed to suppress completely a particular class of speech.
We shall now shift the focus slightly to isolate the "fully pro-
tected" category of speech and attempt to determine the scope of
protection which Justice Harlan would afford to this particular class
against varying degrees of governmental infringement, ranging from
suppression on the one hand to a mere incidental effect upon the pro-
tected activity on the other. In short, we shall consider the breadth
or reach of the constitutional immunities, particularly when counter-
vailing governmental interests in certain forms of regulation are argu-
ably present. At this point is raised the multitude of issues commonly
associated with the controversy over whether governmental and pri-
vate interests should be "weighed" or "balanced" to determine the
scope of protection to be afforded by the first amendment. The contro-
versy reached its zenith in Konigsberg v. State Bar of CaliforniaP2
and Barenblatt v. United States,93 both five-to-four decisions in which
Justice Harlan wrote the majority opinions for the "balancers" and
Justice Black spoke for the antibalancing "absolutists."9 4
Much has been written concerning the balancing controversy.95 It
92. 366 U.S. 36 (1961). There are two cases, involving the same series of litiga-
tion, denominated Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, the first of which appears at
353 U.S. 252 (1957) (Black, J.). It is only the second decision, appearing at 360
U.S. 36 (1961) (hereinafter referred to as Konigsberg II) which is relevant to the
present discussion.
93. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
94. In the following discussion, our concern is primarily with Justice Harlan's
theoretical framework, that is, with the questions as to vhen he would utilize the
balancing device and whether one side of the scale should be more heavily weighted
than the other. The emphasis will not be upon a critique of the definition of par-
ticular interests in specific cases. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that even if
there is agreement as to the theory to be employed there may be great differences
concerning the proper definition of the interests involved. Thus, Mr. Justice Black in
his Barenblatt dissent insisted at length that even if the majority had properly employed
the balancing technique they had nevertheless failed properly to delineate the re-
spective interests at stake. Id. at 144-53. See also Krislov, Mr. Justice Black Reopens
the Free Speech Debate, 11 U.C.L.A. L. Rnv. 189, 208 (1964).
95. See generally A. Bic L, THE LEAsT DANGEaous BRANCH 84-98 (1962); H.
KALVEN, TrE NEGRO AND THE Fmnst AiszlqNiNT 120-21 (1965); P. KA pEn, CVIL
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has been stated that the dispute does not, in fact, concern broad
philosophical differences relating to the proper interpretaton of the
first amendment as much as the narrower issue of the judicial approach
to be adopted with respect to certain types of regulatory actions taken
by the government which do not directly control the content of
speech, but nevertheless restrict in some measure its unfettered
exercise.96 Thus, it is clear that in some circumstances Mr. Justice
Black will endorse the balancing approach.97 On the other hand, it
LmznnmS AND Tnr CONSTITUrTON 114-17 (1961); Black & Cahn, Justice Black and the
First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549 (1962);
Brandwen, The Battle of the First Amendment: A Study In Judicial Interpretation,
40 N.C. L. REv. 273 (1962); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amend-
ment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 907-18 (1963); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance,
71 YALE L. J. 1424 (1962); Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law? 51 CAITF. L. REV.
729 (1963); Freund, Mr. Justice Black and the Judicial Function, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
467 (1967); Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 428 (1967); Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amend-
ment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 267; Kalven, The New York Times
Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV.
191; Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Kalven,
Mr. Alexander Meiklejohn and the Barenblatt Opinion, 27 U. Cm. L. REV. 315 (1960);
Kalven & Steffen, The Bar Admission Cases: An Unfinished Debate Between Justice
Harlan and Justice Black, 21 LAw iN Tn"NsrrIoN 155 (1961); Karst, The First Amend-
ment and Harry Kalven: An Appreciative Comment on the Advantages of Thinking
Small, 13 U.C.L.A. L. 1REv. 1 (1965); Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litiga-
tion, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 75; Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961
Sup CT. REv. 245; Meiklejohn, The Barenblatt Opinion, 27 U. Cm. L. REV. 329
(1960); Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the
Balance, 50 C~AF. L. REv. 821 (1962); Mendelson, The First Amendment and the
Judicial Process, 17 VAND. L. REv. 479 (1964); Nutting, Is the First Amendment
Obsolete?, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 167 (1961).
96. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L. J. 1424, 1428-31
(1962); Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 729, 730-31 (1963);
Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 428, 442-44 (1967); Kalven & Steffen, supra note 95, at 174-77; see Kalven,
The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amend-
ment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 216-17; Karst, The First Amendment and Harry
Kalven: An Appreciative Comment on the Advantages of Thinking Small, 13 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1, 22-24 (1965).
The textual formulation implies that there are two basic forms of regulation-one
directed to the content of speech, the other aimed at conduct but which may inci-
dentally or indirectly affect speech. If speech and conduct could be neatly compart-
mentalized into distinct categories of a mutually exclusive nature, then the theoretical
framework would be relatively easy to delineate. However, Justice Harlan has rec-
ognized that speech-conduct constitutes a continuum and that "as we move away
from speech alone and into the sphere of conduct-even conduct associated with
speech or resulting from it-the area of legitimate governmental interest expands."
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 454 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Thus, a line
drawn simply on a speech/conduct basis will be insufficient, and further distinctions
will have to be attempted. See notes 34 supra and 126-178 infra and accompanying
text.
97. "There are, of course, cases suggesting that a law which primarily regulates
conduct but which might also indirectly affect speech can be upheld if the effect on
speech is minor in relation to the need for control of the conduct. With these cases I
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is somewhat less clear, but nevertheless highly probable, that Justice
Harlan would reject the balancing technique in certain situations. 8
In describing Justice Harlan's approach to the regulation of speech,
it may be well to approach the matter systematically by inquiring
initially whether the Justice would recognize a central core of speech
content which is absolutely immune from governmental regulation,
irrespective of alleged countervailing interests. Some commentators
suggest an affirmative answer,99 although it must be acknowledged
that Justice Harlan has not addressed this point with unmistakableclarity.100
Nevertheless, there are indications that Justice Harlan would, in
fact, recognize a central core of absolute protection for some forms
of speech. Thus, in the course of the opinion in Konigsberg II, Harlan
stated:
At the outset we reject the view that freedom of speech and association
... as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are "absolutes,"
not only in the undoubted sense that where the constitutional protection
agree. Typical of them are Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, and Schneider
v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147. Both of these involved the right of a city to control its
streets..... Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141 (1959) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
98. See generally notes 99-146 infra and accompanying text.
Mr. Justice Harlan's opinions do not pursue deference to the legislative judgment
and balancing of interests with the vigor manifested by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the
following passages: "Free speech cases are not an exception to the principle that we
are not legislators, that direct policy-making is not our province. How best to recon-
cile competing interests is the business of legislatures, and the balance they strike is a
judgment not to be displaced by ours, but to be respected unless outside the pale of
fair judgment." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 539-40 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added); "To state that individual liberties may be affected is
to establish the condition for, not to arrive at the conclusion of, constitutional de-
cision. Against the impediments which particular governmental regulation causes to
entire freedom of individual action, there must be weighted the value to the public
of the ends which the regulation may achieve." Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 91 (1961). It has been suggested that Justice
Frankfurter always found balancing appropriate in first amendment cases. See Krislov,
supra note 94, at 198-99. See also Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71
YALE L. J. 1424, 1428-31 (1962).
99. See, e.g., Frantz, supra note 98, at 1431 & n.43; Frantz, Is the First Amendment
Law?, 51 CALiF. L. REv. 729, 731 (1963); Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black
on the First Amendment, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 428, 442 (1967); Kalven, The New
York Times Case: A Note on the Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964
Sup. CT. REv. 191, 216; Karst, supra note 96, at 22.
100. It must be noted, however, that most of the cases which are brought to the
Supreme Court are the "difficult" ones where the line between constitutionality and
unconstitutionality may be incapable of easy delineation. In many of such cases con-
sideration of the countervailing governmental interest would be, in Justice Harlan's
*view, both appropriate and indispensable. The "easy" case, clearly manifesting activity
within the central core of absolute protection (such as press criticism of the govern-
ment carried on in the face of a statute forbidding that criticism), is rarely before the
Court.
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exists it must prevail, but also in the sense that the scope of that protection
must be gathered solely from a literal reading of the First Amendment.101
The thrust of the italicized section of this rather convoluted sentence
appears to be that the content of speech which is determined to be
within the scope of constitutional protection is absolutely free from
abridgment, and the passage has been so interpreted. 102 Furthermore,
in the immediately succeeding sentences of the Konigsberg opinion,
Justice Harlan refers to "certain forms of speech, or speech in certain
contexts" 10 3 which is without constitutional protection. This category
of speech is juxtaposed with "general regulatory statutes, not intended
to control the content of speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered
exercise .... 104 Governmental regulation in these two areas may pass
muster, but one may suppose that the negative implication of all of
this is that a regulation intended to control the content of speech
which does not fall within a constitutionally unprotected area would
be held to be constitutionally infirm.
Justice Harlan reiterated his unprotected-speech/speech-inciden-
tally-limited analysis in his dissenting opinion in NAACP v. Button.0 5
After commencing with a relatively latitudinarian view of freedom of
expression, 0 6 Harlan characterized the state statute under attack
as one of a general regulatory nature, which at most would merely
incidentally limit the unfettered exercise of speech/association. There-
fore, the test was "to weigh the legitimate interest of the State
against the effect of the regulation on individual rights."07 What is
interesting in the opinion is an extended discussion of the speech-
101. 366 U.S. at 49. (emphasis added).
102. The statement has been paraphrased in the following manner: "We reject the
view that freedom of speech is an 'absolute' if the term 'absolute' comprehends 'not
only' the uncontested proposition that when 'the constitutional protection exists it
must prevail,' but also the additional proposition, which we reject, 'that the scope of
that protection must be gathered solely from a literal reading of the First Amend-
ment."' Frantz, supra note 98, at 1431 n.43. It may of course be argued that the
phrase "where the constitutional protection exists it must prevail" is intended to sug-
gest no more than that after the balancing process has been completed and it is
determined that the individual interest outweighs the governmental interest, then the
individual interest will prevail. This rendering, however, reduces the statement to an
unuseful tautology: An interest which it has been previously determined shall prevail
will prevail.
103. 366 U.S. at 50.
104. 366 U.S. at 50 (emphasis added).
105. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
106. "Freedom of expression embraces more than the right of an individual to
speak his mind. It includes also his right to advocate and his right to join with his
fellows in an effort to make that advocacy effective. . . . And just as it includes the
right jointly to petition the legislature for redress of grievances, . ..so it must include
the right to join together for purposes of obtaining judicial redress." Id. at 452-53.
107. Id. at 453.
1968 ]
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conduct continuum, with the notation that progressively lesser protec-
tion is accorded as one moves from pure speech to pure conduct.
However, the significance for our search for a central core of absolute
protection is Harlan's catalogue of actions which the state may not
undertake when regulating. Thus, the state "may not prohibit all
informational picketing;"'1 "it may not prevent advocacy of union
membership;" 109 it may not "wholly eliminate the right of collective
action by workingmen;"" 0 and it "surely may not broadly prohibit
individuals with a common interest from joining together to petition
a court for redress of their grievances."' These examples intimate
the existence of a hard core of absolute constitutional protection
which cannot be "balanced away."12
In a different area, that of libel actions instituted by public officials,
Justice Harlan joined with the majority in New York Times v.
Sullivan,13 which defined a broad immunity for criticism of public
officials, defeasible only upon a showing of actual malice or gross
negligence." 4 Furthermore, there is much language in Harlan's
108. Id. at 454.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 455.
112. It must be noted that Justice Harlan imposes a clear and present danger test
upon his analysis, albeit a strict one. Thus he states that "[a]bsent the gravest danger
to the community, these rights [to associate, to discuss, and to advocate] must remain
free from frontal attack or suppression . . . ." Id. The imposition of a clear and
present danger test may be related to the notion of absolute protection for speech
in at least two ways: (1) The speech which produces a clear and present danger
may be assimilated to conduct (hence "verbal conduct") and as conduct may be
regulated by the government. It may be noted in passing that this is the theory upon
which Justice Black would allow punishment for shouting "fire" falsely in a crowded
theatre. See Black & Calm, supra note 95, at 558. It is also significant that when
Justice Harlan in Garner v. Louisiana refers to a clear and present danger limitation
upon speech he is evidently contemplating regulable conduct such as physical assault
or rioting. See notes 130-134 infra and accompanying text. Also to be noted is Justice
Harlan's concept of a speech-conduct continuum which allows greater governmental
regulation of "conduct associated with speech or resulting from it." See note 96 supra
(emphasis added). (2) An alternative analysis would suggest that a clear and present
danger test, particularly one which requires a minimal demonstration of actual, imminent
danger to a state interest, effectively emasculates the notion of a central core of
absolute protection for speech, or at least reduces that core of protection significantly.
One would essentially be left with a balancing notion which may give additional weight
to the "preferred freedoms." The constitutional protection would, however, be de-
feasible upon a showing of a sufficient governmental interest.
Because of Justice Harlan's reference in Button to the "gravest dangers to the
community" and his intimations in Garner and Button that it is illegal conduct toward
which his clear and present danger test is directed, it would appear that the former
analysis is the better view. Thus, a clear and present danger test need not necessarily
be inconsistent with absolute protection for the content of speech.
113. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
114. Id. at 279-80.
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plurality opinion in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts"15 which manifests
a latitudinarian view of the freedoms of speech and of the press.
Thus the Justice stated that:
[t]he dissemination of the individual's opinions on matters of public interest
is for us, in the historic words of the Declaration of Independence, an
"inalienable right" that "governments are instituted among men to secure."
History shows us that the Founders were not always convinced that un-
limited discussion of public issues would be "for the benefit of all of us"
116
but that they firmly adhered to the proposition that the "true liberty of the
press" permitted "every man to publish his opinions."
117
And again, "dissemination of information and opinion on questions
of public concern is ordinarily a legitimate, protected and indeed
cherished activity ... .""8 After noting that the law of libel, because
directed toward the content of speech, is difficult to harmonize with
the constitutional guarantees of speech and press,1 9 Justice Harlan
resolved the dilemma by focusing upon the publisher's conduct
20
By concentrating upon the reasonableness of the investigative tech-
niques employed by the publisher,12 1 Harlan seemingly obviated
the alternative of permitting direct restraints upon the content of
the press.'2
There are further scattered indications that Justice Harlan would
recognize a central core of absolute protection in the first amendment.
115. 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (Harlan, J., joined by Clark, Stewart, and Fortas, JJ.).
116. [Harlan's footnote renumbered] See Levy, Legacy of Suppression. The phrase
is from the Court's opinion in Time, Inc. v. Hill [385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967)].
117. 388 U.S. at 149-50, quoting Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319, 325
(1788).
118. 388 U.S. at 150.
119. Id. at 151-54.
120. "It is the conduct element, therefore, on which we must principally focus if
we are successfully to resolve the antithesis between civil libel actions and the freedom
of speech and press. Impositions based on misconduct can be neutral with respect to
content of the speech involved, free of historical taint, and adjusted to strike a fair
balance between the interests of the community in free circulation of information and
those of individuals in seeking recompense for harm done by the circulation of dfama-
tory falsehood." Id. at 153. (emphasis added).
121. "We consider and would hold that a 'public figure' who is not a public
official may also recover damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes
substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable con-
duct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and report-
ing ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." Id. at 155. (emphasis added).
122. See generally Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill,
Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 267.
On the theme of the free communication of ideas, Justice Harlan indicated in his
concurring opinion in Alberts v. California that any substantial interference with this
communicative process would constitute a violation of the due process clause. See
354 U.S. at 502-03. See also Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 702
(1959) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).
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Thus, in his dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, he quoted with
approval the statement that "[tlhe fundamental theory of liberty
upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any
general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them
to accept instruction from public teachers only."lm Immediately
thereafter, justice Harlan added the following:
I consider this so, even though today those decisions would probably have
gone by reference to the concepts of freedom of expression and conscience
assured against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment, concepts that
are derived from the explicit guarantees of the First Amendment against
federal encroachment upon freedom of speech and belief.124
This discussion has been pursued to demonstrate that Justice Harlan
would provide absolute protection for the content of speech, except
in the case of those narrowly defined categories which a consistent
majority of the Court has traditionally held to be without constitu-
tional protection.'25 Different results are reached, however, when we
begin to move along the speech/conduct continuum. In this area, we
move away from regulations effectually controlling the content of
speech, and instead confront governmental action which ostensibly
regulates conduct, but which may also produce consequences of
greater or lesser severity for the free and unfettered exercise of
speech.
A. Regulation Pursuant to Valid Public Interest
with Direct Effect upon Speech
The first situation to be explored is that in which the government
takes action pursuant to an admittedly valid public interest, but the
effect of the regulation, nevertheless, is to curtail or restrict particular
modes of promulgation of speech or forms of association otherwise
constitutionally protected. Therefore, there is a direct clash of
interests, with the "private" interest experiencing immediate and
significant curtailment. Justice Harlan's approach in this area, as
will become clearer in the subsequent discussion of particular cases,
123. 367 U.S. at 543-44, quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925) (emphasis added).
124. 367 U.S. at 544. It should be noted that Justice Harlan's substantive due
process notion of protection for "fundamental rights," explored in Poe v. Ullman and
Griswold v. Connecticut, involves no balancing process, as that phrase is commonly
understood. The "fundamental right," once defined, prevails ipso facto over the re-
strictive state statute concededly enacted pursuant to a legitimate state interest.
125. The categorization of speech into protected and unprotected classes is itself,
properly spealdng, not produced by a balancing process but rather by an a priori
definition of the constitutionally protected "freedom of speech."
[ VOL. 21
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN HARLAN
does not involve ad hoc balancing of the respective interests, as that
process has become known through his opinions in Barenblatt and
Konigsberg II. Here it is clear that the interest relating to freedom
of speech/association is given special emphasis (a preferred position,
if you like), such that it will only be subordinated to the asserted
public interest upon a demonstration of extraordinary circumstances
by the government (for example, a clear and present danger of a
serious evil) .'2 Of course, since the area in question is concededly
subject to governmental regulation to some degree, and since it is
acknowledged that the public interest may prevail theoretically in
special circumstances, it may be urged that Harlan is in fact employ-
ing a balancing technique. Such a description would not necessarily
be inaccurate, assuming that it is recognized that the scales are
heavily weighted in favor of the individual interest in speech.12 7
Among the Harlan opinions which illustrate the application of the
foregoing "preferred interests" theory is his concurrence in Garner v.
Louisiana.'m In the Garner case, Harlan was the only Justice who was
willing to assimilate a sit-in demonstration into the category of con-
stitutionally protected "'free trade in ideas,"' or "verbal expression,
more commonly thought of as 'speech." 129  Justice Harlan then
acknowledged that the state has a legitimate interest "in preserving
126. See Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 202-03 (1961).
127. Compare Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. CT.
REV. 75, 94.
It has been suggested that an approach giving special emphasis to "preferred free-
doms" is a "halfway house between the balancing of interests and the absolutist po-
sition." Krislov, supra note 94, at 206.
128. 368 U.S. 157, 185 (1961).
129. Id. at 201. It must be noted that the great potential of Justice Harlan's
characterization of the demonstration as protected "speech" is significantly mitigated
by his emphasis upon the notion that the defendants in Garner were sitting at the
lunch counter "with the consent of the owner." Id. at 202. He does state that the
demand of police officers that the individuals leave the premises would not vitiate the
initial consent. If it were otherwise, "[siimply by ordering a defendant to cease his
'protected' activity, the officer could turn a continuation of that activity into a breach
of the peace." Id. at 204 n.11. Nevertheless, by defining the "protected activity" in
terms of the consent of the owner, Harlan constricts rather narrowly the scope of his
doctrine. See KALvEN, THE NEGRo AND Tnr FrST AA.MENDMENT 130-33 (1965).
Quite consistently, when later defendants demonstrated on private property without
the owner's consent, Justice Harlan joined other Justices in the view that a trespass
conviction was proper. E.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 318 (1964) (Black, J.,
dissenting). In partial defense of the Harlan restrictions, it can be said that a rule
which would extend constitutional protection unconditionally to demonstrations would
be totally unacceptable; for it would raise the- specter of invasions of private property,
including homes, for the purpose of thrusting "ideas" upon the owners/occupants. A
limitation more suitable than the consent notion, however, might have accorded protec-




peace and harmony within its borders."13 Nevertheless, the state
had sought to pursue this goal by subjecting to criminal sanctions,
through "a general and all-inclusive breach of the peace prohibi-
tion,"131 activity which "except for a demonstrated paramount state
interest. .. ." would be constitutionally protected. 32 Since a state
may not "suppress free communication of views .. .under the guise
of conserving desirable conditions,"'1 it is required in the first instance
to make a specific judgment that the otherwise protected activity
constitutes a "clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the
State."134 Thus, the "necessity" test employed would require initially
a specific judgment by the state that the governmental interest could
be effectuated only by a curtailment of the otherwise protected
activity. This formulation constitutes a significantly stricter standard
than merely requiring the state to demonstrate a "rational relation"
between the governmental interest and the means employed to imple-
ment that interest.135
Another example illustrative of the Harlan approach is found in the
complex litigation produced by the ultimately futile attempt by
Alabama to oust the NAACP from that state. The case, in one form
or another, reached the Supreme Court a total of four times, resulting
in two opinions by justice Harlan. 36 The thrust of the latter opinions
130. 368 U.S. at 202.
131. Id.
132. 368 U.S. at 202 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 203, quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
134. 368 U.S. at 202-03, quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940).
(emphasis added). Justice Harlan relied heavily in Garner upon the unanimous
opinion, per Roberts, J., in Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra. The following passage
from the latter opinion gives some insight as to what Justice Harlan might consider
to be a "substantial interest" of the state: "No one would have the hardihood to
suggest that the principle of freedom of speech sanctions incitement to riot or that
religious liberty connotes the privilege to exhort others to physical attack upon those
belonging to another sect. When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, inter-
ference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public
safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious.
Equally obvious is it that a State may not unduly suppress free communication of
views, religious or other, under the guise of conserving desirable conditions." 310 U.S.
at 308.
135. See Krislov, supra note 94, at 198-99; notes 143-146, 175-178 infra and ac-
companying text.
136. Alabama initially attempted to apply to the NAACP its statute requiring the
qualification of organizations transacting intrastate business. In the course of this
procedure, a suit was brought in 1965 in an Alabama state court to enjoin the NAACP
from conducting further intrastate activities. In this proceeding the NAACP was
ordered to produce the names and addresses of all of its Alabama members and agents,
The NAACP refused to comply fully with the court order and was adjudged in con-
tempt. On appeal, the Supreme Court, per Harlan, J., held that the membership lists
were immune from state scrutiny because of the "substantial restraint" which dis-
closure would have upon the associational rights of the NAACP members. NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). When the Alabama Supreme Court thereafter
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is directed toward the nature of the protected associational rights of
the NAACP members and is bottomed upon the following premises:
(1) "Freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs
and ideas" is protected by the fourteenth amendment as an adjunct
to, or extension of, the freedom of speech; 37 (2) governmental action
"regarded as entailing the likelihood of a substantial restraint" 38
upon the otherwise protected activity can be sustained only by the
demonstration of an overriding valid state interest which is "com-
pelling."139 The Court found that the state had failed to establish a
paramount interest in the public disclosure of NAACP membership
lists which was sufficient to justify the considerable deterrent effect,
which such disclosure would entail, upon the otherwise protected
activities of the association members. Justice Harlan concluded that
the Alabama regulations had been unconstitutionally imposed upon
the NAACP.
A similar approach, giving primacy to the interest in speech, was
followed by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Talley v.
California,140 in which the Court held unconstitutional a municipal
ordinance prohibiting the dissemination of anonymous handbills.
Here, Harlan's general formulation of the applicable constitutional
principle was not radically different from that in Garner and NAACP
v. Alabama: "state action impinging on free speech and association
will not be sustained unless the governmental interest asserted to
support such impingement is compelling."141 The ordinance was al-
legedly intended to aid in the detection of individuals attempting to
perpetrate fraud, false advertising, libel, and the like. Noting that
the ordinance was not limited to the suppression of these objectionable
materials, Harlan concluded that the state had made an insufficient
reaffirmed the judgment of contempt, the United States Supreme Court again reversed
and remanded. 360 U.S. 240 (1959) (per curiam). A year later, since no hearings
had been held in the state courts, the NAACP brought suit in the federal district court
to obtain relief from the 1956 decree. The district court dismissed the suit, the court
of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court
should proceed unless Alabama "within a reasonable time, no later than January 2,
1962" should permit the NAACP to seek dissolution of the restraining order against
its activities. 368 U.S. 16 (1961) (per curiam). The state court thereafter heard
the case and permanently enjoined the NAACP from carrying on activities in Alabama.
This final decree was reversed by the United States Supreme Court in NAACP v.
Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964) (Harlan, J.).
137. 357 U.S. at 460.
138. Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
139. 357 U.S. at 460, 462, 463 (emphasis added).
140. 362 U.S. 60, 66 (1960).




showing to justify "the deterrent effect on free speech which this
all-embracing ordinance is likely to have."142
A slightly different light is cast upon this particular class of cases
by Harlan's analysis in his concurring opinion in McLaughlin v.
Florida.43 The Court in McLaughlin held that, assuming the exis-
tence of a valid state interest in the prohibition of sexual promiscuity,
nevertheless, Florida could not single out promiscuous interracial
couples for special statutory penalties. 144 The Court's theory was
that state action which "trenches" upon the constitutionally protected
freedom from racial discrimination would be upheld "only if ...
necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment
of a permissible state policy."145 The relevance of this test to the
present discussion is that Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion,
specifically adopted this "necessity" test, which he determined to
have been originally developed "to protect free speech against state
infringement."' 46 Thus we have an explicit repudiation by Justice
Harlan of the notion that governmental action which was merely
rationally related to the effectuation of a legitimate state interest
could be sustained if the effect of that action was to restrict sub-
stantially ("trench upon" in the phraseology of the McLaughlin
majority) the right of free speech. In brief summary, when state
regulation is not designed to control directly the content of speech,
but in its effect tends significantly to restrict, deter, or suppress
otherwise protected modes of communication, then the state regula-
tion will prevail only if it is responsive to a compelling or demon-
strated paramount state interest and is necessary (indispensable) to
the effectuation of that interest.
B. Regulation of Conduct with Incidental Effect upon Speech
The second category of regulation to be considered is that which
is directed basically toward conduct or an object other than the
content of speech, but which may have a merely incidental effect
upon the unhindered exercise of speech.147 It is here that the
142. 362 U.S. at 67.
143. 379 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
144. Id. at 196. The decision in McLaughlin did not require the Court to declare
unconstitutional Florida's miscegenation statute. This final step was taken by a
unanimous Court on fourteenth amendment grounds in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967).
145. 379 U.S. at 196.
146. Id. at 197, citing, among other cases, NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307-08
(1964).
147. The phrase "merely incidental effect upon speech" is indicative of a charac-
terization which Justice Harlan would use in stating his conclusion concerning a
particular regulation. Of course, if the issue in a particular case is whether the
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balancing controversy emerges full-blown in Barenblatt and Konigs-
berg II. One formulation of Justice Harlan's balancing approach is
contained in Konigsberg 11:
. . . general regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of
speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been re-
garded as the type of law the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade
Congress or the States to pass, when they have been found justified by sub-
ordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality
which has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmental interest in-
volved.... It is in the latter class of cases that this Court has always placed
rules compelling disclosure of prior association as an incident of the informed
exercise of a valid governmental function. . . Whenever, in such a con-
text, these constitutional protections are asserted against the exercise of
valid governmental powers a reconciliation must be effected, and that per-
force requires an appropriate weighing of the respective interests involved. 148
The key phrase in the foregoing passage is "incidentally limiting . . .
[the] unfettered exercise [of speech]." Such a characterization of the
effect of the governmental action is a necessary prerequisite to the
utilization of the balancing approach. Thus, in Konigsberg II, Justice
Harlan, speaking for the Court, determined that California's inquiry
into past Communist Party membership of prospective bar members
would have a "minimal effect" upon -free association.149 That being
so, he weighed the state's interest "in having lawyers who are devoted
to the law.. . , including its procedures for orderly change"150 against
the effect which disclosure of Communist affiliation was likely to
have upon rights of association, and concluded that the former
interest was "clearly sufficient to outweigh" the latter.' 51 Finally, the
Court employed the "substantial relation" test to evaluate the specific
state procedure, namely, compulsory disclosure of Communist Party
deterrent effect on speech is "merely incidental" or "more than incidental," then to
phrase the issue in the form "the effect is merely incidental, therefore the regulation
is valid" is to assume the conclusion. On one level, it is true, the dispute between
Justice Harlan and Black in Barenblatt and Konigsberg I1 may be viewed as a disagree-
ment over the extent to which speech will be deterred as a result of the particular
governmental action. There is also a doctrinal dispute, however, which may be more
significant. Justice Black would presumably authorize a balancing test only when the
governmental action constituted a nondiscriminatory regulation of such matters as
the time and place of speech (although Black uses a direct/indirect-effect-upon-speech
dichotomy for his analysis in Barenblatt). However, regulation which deters or inter-
feres with speech generally, even incidentally or inadvertently, is void. See Kalven,
Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 428,
443-44 (1967). With this latter notion, Justice Harlan would disagree; that is, he
would balance the asserted governmental interest against its incidental deterrent effect
in order to determine the regulations validity.
148. 366 U.S. at 50-51 (emphasis added).





membership. The Court held that the "state's interest in ascertaining
the fitness of the employee for the post he holds" is not "insubstanti-
ally related" to inquiry about Communist Party membership. 152 The
Court premised its conclusion on the notion derived from Barenblatt
and earlier cases, which validated "the legitimacy of a statutory
finding that membership in the Communist Party is not unrelated to
the danger of use for . . . illegal ends of powers given for limited
purposes." 53
A further example of Justice Harlan's approach to these general
balancing problems is his dissent in NAACP v. Button, 54 which in-
volved Virginia's attempt to place the activities of the NAACP within
a statutory ban upon "the improper solicitation of any legal or profes-
sional business."15 The majority concluded that the NAACP had
acted within the protection of the first amendment and that the state
had failed to demonstrate "any substantial regulatory interest" to
justify the broad prohibitory action which it had undertaken. 1 6 In
his dissent, Justice Harlan acknowledged that freedom of expression
encompasses one's right "to advocate and his right to join with his
fellows in an effort to make that advocacy effective." 151 Harlan noted,
however, that there was a speech-conduct continuum and that the
further the regulatory effect of the state's action became removed
from speech in its pristine form, the greater the latitude of the state
becomes in regulating the activity. Thus he stated that:
... as we move away from speech alone and into the sphere of conduct-
even conduct associated with speech or resulting from it-the area of le-
gitimate governmental interest expands. A regulation not directly suppress-
ing speech or peaceable assembly, but having some impact on the form
or manner of their exercise will be sustained if the regulation has a reason-
able relationship to a proper governmental objective and does not unduly
interfere with such individual rights.158
Applying this test, and citing the "incidental effect upon speech"
criterion from Konigsberg II, Harlan concluded that the state's inter-
est "in maintaining high professional standards among those who
152. Id.
153. Id. at 52.
154. 371 U.S. 415, 448 (1963).
155. Id. at 419.
156. Id. at 444.
157. Id. at 452.
158. Id. at 454. (emphasis added). Later in the opinion the test employed by
Justice Harlan was formulated in the following manner: ". . . [T]he question is
whether the particular regulation of conduct concerning litigation has a reasonable
relation to the furtherance of a proper state interest, and whether that interest
outweighs any foreseeable harm to the furtherance of protected freedoms." Id. at 455
(emphasis added).
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practice law within its borders"'5 9 outweighed any incidental deterrent
effect upon freedom of expression and association.160
Consideration must also be given to the legislative investigation
cases, the most notable of which for our purposes is Justice Harlan's
opinion for the Court in Barenblatt v. United States.161 In assessing
the validity of the investigative techniques employed by a subcommit-
tee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities against the
alleged deterrent effect upon first amendment associational rights
resulting from compelled disclosure, Justice Harlan was quite clear
that a balancing approach for this type of case is always appropri-
ate.16 After noting briefly that the proper constitutional principle
required "'the subordinating interest of the State must be compelling'
in order to overcome the individual rights at stake,"'6 Justice Harlan
explored at length the question whether "this investigation was
related to a valid legislative purpose. . . ."16 The investigative objec-
tive was inquiry into the activities of the Communist Party, which
the Court had previously viewed as, at least, a quasi-subversive organ-
ization.16 Justice Harlan combined this factor with his previous
conclusion that the particular questions asked of the defendant-
witness were pertinent to the inquiry, 6 and concluded that the
investigation was valid. Discussion of the individual interests at
159. Id. at 455.
160. Id. at 455. When it is necessary for the Justices to delineate and balance the
respective interests in a particular case, it is virtually inevitable that they will reach
different conclusions. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). Furthermore, as Justice Harlan noted in his dissent
in Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 227 & n.3 (1967), the precedential
value of many of the balancing decisions is impaired to the extent that later cases pre-
sent a relatively divergent amalgam of interests. In the latter event, the balance of
interests must be struck anew. It will be noted that many of the recent cases which
have prominently employed the balancing technique (in one or more of the opinions)
have dealt with a single issue-namely, the deterrent effect which compelled disclosure
of associational memberships is likely to have upon the exercise of first amendment
rights. In these cases, the result achieved by the majority has followed a rather con-
sistent pattern: where the issue of racial equality was involved, the Court has sustained
the private interest. However, when Communist Party membership was the issue, the
balance has usually been struck in favor of the governmental interest. The cases are
collected in Franz, Is the First Amendment Law?, 51 CALIF. L. IEv. 729, 731 & n.10
(1963). But see United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); of. Aptheker v. Rusk,
378 U.S. 500 (1964).
161. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
162. "Where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation
resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing
private and public interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown." Id. at 126.
(emphasis added).
163. Id. at 127, citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463-66 (1958).
164. 360 U.S. at 127, 127-33.
165. Id. at 128-29.
166. Id. at 123-24.
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stake was extremely summary and consisted largely of the suggestion
(probably to be revived by future litigants167) that the subcommittee
had not attempted, as far as the record indicated, to "pillory wit-
nesses" or to employ "indiscriminate dragnet procedures" to obtain
appearances before the subcommittee.
68
It may be noted in passing that in his Barenblatt opinion justice
Harlan appears almost to have inverted the test which he purports
to apply. Initially, he states that the governmental interest must be
"compelling" in order to overcome the individual interests at stake.
This formulation implies that particular deference is to be given to
the individual interests. 16 9 Yet the emphasis upon such interests is
so niggardly that, by the conclusion of the opinion, one is left with
the impression that, to the contrary, it is the individual interest in
speech/expression which must be shown to be "compelling" by a
demonstration of peculiar circumstances in order to prevail.
Furthermore, viewed as a balancing case, Barenblatt may cause
some concern by the insistence therein that balancing is always
appropriate in governmental interrogation cases. If we are correct
in the premise that a prerequisite to utilization of the balancing tech-
nique is the determination that the effect of the governmental action
upon individual interests is merely "incidental,"170 then the conclusion
would seem to follow that a priori governmental interrogation, via
legislative committees or otherwise, could never have more than an
"incidental" effect upon individual freedoms. This latter is a proposi-
tion which gives one pause and could be reluctantly endorsed only
with the greatest caution and circumspection.
167. See Stamler v. Willis, 371 F.2d 413 (7th Cir. 1966); See generally Note, HUAC
and the "Chilling Effect": The Dombrowski Rationale Applied, 21 RUTGERS L. REv.
679 (1967).
168. 360 U.S. at 134. Justice Harlan employed a similar approach in his dissenting
opinion in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 496 (1960), in which the state of Arkansas
had attempted to compel the disclosure of all the associational ties of teachers in the
public school system. Harlan stated that when the governmental action in question
"pertains to the reahn of investigation, our inquiry has a double aspect: first, whether
the investigation relates to a legitimate governmental purpose; second, whether judged in
the light of that purpose, the questioned action has substantial relevance thereto."
Id. at 497-98. It will be noted that this formulation omits entirely a reference to
countervailing private interests and has been severely criticized for its apparent breadth.
See Karst, The First Amendment and Harry Kalven: An Appreciative Comment on the
Advantages of Thinking Small, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1, 23-24 (1965). There is, how-
ever, a loophole for the protection of individual interests-the strict requirement of
"pertinency" applied in investigation cases. Id. It will be recalled that Justice Harlan
has joined the majority in reversing convictions when the pertinency of questions was
not clear or had not been made known to the defendant/witness with sufficient clarity.
See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Watkins v. United States,
354 U.S. 178 (1957).
169. See notes 126-146 supra and accompanying text.
170. See notes 148-152, 158-160 supra and accompanying text.
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The balancing approach is sometimes criticized by Justice Black,
among others, on the theory that it tends to produce results which
unduly subordinate individual to governmental interests.' 7' In this
connection, Justice Harlan's concurrence in United States v. O'Brien
7 2
is of interest. The majority opinion by Chief Justice Warren held
that draft card burning did not constitute constitutionally protected
"speech." In the course of his opinion, the Chief Justice noted that
the draft card regulations "further[ed] an important or substantial
government interest" and that the "incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedom" was no greater than is "essential to the
furtherance of that interest." 73 While generally concurring in this
formulation, Justice Harlan nevertheless felt that it was not sufficiently
qualified. Therefore, he wanted:
to make explicit [his] understanding that this passage [did] not foreclose
consideration of First Amendment claims in those rare instances when an
"incidental" restriction upon expression, imposed by a regulation which
furthers an "important or substantial" governmental interest. .. in prac-
tice has the effect of entirely preventing a "speaker" from reaching a sig-
nificant audience with whom he could not otherwise lawfully communi-
cate.174
Thus, Justice Harlan has explicitly recognized a circumstance in
which the balancing approach, where there is only an "incidental"
effect upon first amendment rights, may nevertheless produce subordi-
nation of the governmental regulation to the individual interests.
It may be suggested that Justice Harlan is in fact merely applying
a single balancing test in all of these cases, with no special preference
given in any event to the assertion of first amendment rights. The
fact that extended discussion in some opinions concerns the private
interest and in others emphasizes the governmental interest 75 may
be explained on the basis that the one interest or the other has been
determined, in the balance, to outweigh the alleged competing
interest. Support for this conclusion can be found in the fact that in
his theoretical discussion, for example in Konigsberg II, Harlan does
not appear to distinguish between governmental regulations which
"incidentally affect" and those which "substantially restrain" the
171. As suggested previously, however, the Supreme Court as a whole has preferred
the individual interests in civil rights cases and has emphasized the governmental interest
in internal security cases. Note 160 supra.
172. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
173. Id. at 377.
174. Id. at 388.
175. Compare, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), and notes 126-144
supra and accompanying text with Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1960),
and notes 147-167 supra and accompanying text.
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exercise of first amendment rights. Additionally, some of the cases
which have been placed in different categories herein are cited
occasionally interchangeably by Justice Harlan.
176
Nevertheless, it would appear that more incisive analysis indi-
cates that the cases, viewed from the standpoint of the effect of the
regulation upon the exercise of speech, can be categorized generally
along lines similar to those suggested herein.177 However, recognition
by Justice Harlan of the continuum from speech to conduct raises
a warning against categorical rigidity in analyzing his views. With
that caveat in mind, there is certainly a doctrinal distinction to be
drawn in measuring the effect of a regulation upon speech between
the "substantial restraint" of NAACP v. Alabama, the "deterrent
effect" of Talley v. California, and the suppression of speech in Garner
v. Louisiana, on the one hand, and the "incidental effect" upon
speech (in Harlan's view) in Konigsberg II, Barenblatt, and Button
on the other. In the former class of regulations, we are told that the
legitimate state interest must be "overriding" or "compelling"
(NAACP v. Alabama; Talley v. California), "paramount" or "sub-
stantial" (Garner v. Louisiana), and the procedure to implement the
interest must be "necessary," and not merely rationally related, to
the furtherance of the state interest (McLaughlin v. Florida). How-
ever, where the effect upon speech is merely "incidental," we learn
from Konigsberg II, Barenblatt, and Button that the regulation need
bear only a "reasonable relation" to a legitimate governmental inter-
est, which interest in turn outweighs any "foreseeable harm" to
176. Thus, for example, the principle of NAACP v. Alabama that the "'subordinat-
ing interest of the State must be compelling' in order to overcome the individual consti-
tutional rights at stake" is stated to be controlling in Barenblatt. See note 163 supra
and accompanying text. But see text following note 165 supra. Or, again, a free speech
case such as Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), is cited in Konigsberg II
as an example of a "general regulatory statute . . . incidentally limiting" the exercise
of speech, while in McLaughlin v. Florida it is cited for the proposition that state
infringements of free speech must be necessary, and not merely rationally related, to
the effectuation of a legitimate state policy. Again, in Konigsberg II, both Barenblatt
and NAACP v. Alabama are cited together as "balancing" cases.
177. Of course, to the extent that governmental interests are also necessarily taken
into account, the presence or absence of such interests cannot be ignored. It may be
noted that in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 496 (1960) (dissenting opinion),
Justice Harlan analyzed NAACP v. Alabama in terms of a lack of legitimate state
interest in the regulatory scheme there struck down. Id. at 498. If it is determined
that the state has no legitimate interest in the enforcement of a particular regulation,
then one may suppose that it could be struck down on Justice Harlan's general sub-
stantive due process notion of freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and
purposeless restraints without even considering a specific countervailing private inter-
est. The statements in Shelton v. Tucker to the contrary, however, the opinion as
written in NAACP v. Alabama focuses upon the "substantial restraint" upon private
interests rather than upon the lack of legitimate state interest in the regulation, al-
though the latter factor is assuredly presented as a significant element.
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protected first amendment freedoms. It may be, however, that, as
suggested above, all of Justice Harlan's opinions should be viewed
as requiring a form of balancing, with the stipulation that as the
restraint upon speech becomes greater the more severe is the burden
upon the government to sustain its regulation.178
CONCLUSION
There are a number of points that might be made in the course of
a systematic critique of Justice Harlan's judicial philosophy in general
and in his approach to free speech problems in particular. A few of
these have been alluded to or discussed in previous sections of this
article. Here we shall merely emphasize a few highlights by way of
summary and conclusion.
Initially, it may be reiterated that Justice Harlan's position in
regard to protection of individual liberties has varied greatly in
relation to that adopted by other Justices. Occasionally, as in Garner
v. Louisiana and Poe v. Ullman, he has been in the vanguard, arguing
for the extension of protection when few other Justices would concur.
More frequently, perhaps, he has been more reluctant than others to
extend protection in the penumbral area of the first amendment; his
dissent in Button, as well as his opinions for five-man majorities in
Barenblatt and Konigsberg 1I are clear examples of this reluctance.
The moral is, I suppose, that labels such as "conservative" and "liberal"
when applied to eminent jurists are at least frequently misleading.179
Secondly, emphasis should be given to Justice Harlan's notion of
substantive due process, developed in Poe v. Ullman and Griswold v.
Connecticut as being unrelated to the Bill of Rights. If the notion
that due process means freedom from "all substantial arbitrary imposi-
tions and purposeless restraints" were liberally construed and applied,
then it would appear to have great potential as a broad charter of
liberty for the individual. The fundamental objection to this ap-
proach is not that it uniquely leaves judges free to roam at large with
insufficient guidelines; conscientious judges could be given the task
178. It will be noted that in his Konigsbury I1 opinion, Justice Harlan refers to
the necessity for an "appropriate" weighing of individual and governmental interests.
The term "appropriate" could be read to indicate that different balancing tests are re-
quired, depending upon such factors as the gravity of the state's interest and the
degree of restraint upon individual rights. This interpretation would sanction, at least
in some circumstances, a balancing approach heavily weighted in favor of the indi-
vidual interest as an a priori matter before a detailed analysis of the respective interests
involved was accomplished.
179. But see generally G. Scumimwa, THE JuDIculm MIND: ThE ATrruEs AND
IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME CoUrT JUsTIcEs 1946-1963 (1965). On the alleged shift in
Justice Black's philosophy in recent years, see generally Ash, The Growth of Justice
Black's Philosophy of Freedom of Speech 1962-1966, 1967 Wis. L. PREv. 840.
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of interpreting the "traditions of the English-speaking peoples" under
a rubric such as due process. After all, no one has really disputed
that privacy in general or marital privacy in particular, is a funda-
mental value in our society; 180 the divergence of opinion arises when
it is sought to elevate this interest into the realm of constitutional
dogma. The real problem is whether judges are limited under our
system to legislating interstitially, that is, to filling in the gaps created
by specific statutory or constitutional provisions, or whether they
have the broader power or duty to create fundamental changes in
the law-to "keep the Constitution in tune with the times," as some
would prefer to characterize the process.' 81 On this latter issue, one
must concede some doubts. Particularly, this is so if one's general
philosophy emphasizes the primacy of the political processes and a
concomitant restraint upon the judiciary. This is not to say that
notions of judicially-created substantive due process and judicial
self-restraint are necessarily contradictory or inconsistent. Never-
theless, while a philosophy containing both concepts may constitute
a unity, there remains a significant possibility that a certain degree
of tension will be found within the overall system. However, once
a notion of substantive due process is generally acknowledged,
through the adoption of the "total incorporation" doctrine, the "selec-
tion incorporation" notion, or otherwise, there seems to be scant
imperative for limiting it to eighteenth century modes of thought
expressed incompletely in the Bill of Rights, some of whose provisions
are arguably quite obsolete. 82
When we come to Justice Harlan's view of the limitations which
the first and fourteenth amendments place upon the state and federal
governments, a number of responses, favorable and unfavorable, are
evoked. To begin with the unfavorable, it may be noted that we are
met in the various Harlan opinions with a dizzying proliferation of
doctrine; the barest surface of which has been scratched in the preced-
180. See also note 63 supra.
181. The latter theory has been criticized severely in recent years by Justice Black.
See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 518-23 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
182. I assume, for the sake of this discussion, what seems to be the better view
of the "incorporation" and "selective incorporation" doctrines, namely, that they are
premised upon infirm historical bases. Thus, incorporation of all of the provisions of
the Bill of Rights, or of selected portions thereof, necessarily rests on a concept of
substantive due process-but upon a concept limited to specific sections of the first
eight amendments. Why the concept should be so limited is unclear. Of course, if one
insists upon the view that the "incorporation" doctrine represents the better historical
view, then it is at least consistent to argue that the Constitution is to be interpreted
solely in accordance with the intentions of the framers of the Bill of Rights and the
fourteenth amendment and read the intention of the framers as requiring "incorpora-
tion."
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ing exposition. 1' Distinction is built upon distinction, theory upon
theory. One wonders if the Constitution really commands all of the
nuances and technicalities which Justice Harlan has read into the
first and fourteenth amendments. Furthermore, it must be remem-
bered that we do not have a single coherent exposition of first amend-
ment theory presented by Harlan by which to analyze his various
opinions and the results reached therein. This is perhaps a bit too
much to expect in a case-by-case decisional process in which highly
disparate factual circumstances are presented to the Court. Never-
theless, there are occasionally loose ends which are simply left hang-
ing. For example, in the obscenity cases we are told that the first
amendment applies a less strict standard to the states through the
fourteenth than it does to the federal government. Not only are we
left somewhat in the dark as to the reasons underlying each wing of
this dual approach,'m but this particular element mysteriously fails
to reappear in any other area of first/fourteenth amendment analysis.
On the positive side, there is much to be said for Justice Harlan's
balancing approach as a technique, quite apart from an evaluation
of the results reached in particular cases. The merit of balancing is
that it tends, theoretically at least, to bring into the open in a rational
discourse the various competing interests which contend for accep-
tance by the Supreme Court. 85 The hope is, I suppose, that rigorous
analysis will be substituted for decision by slogan. 86 Of course, it
may occur in some instances that a constitutional provision will be
sufficiently specific, or the interests involved will be sufficiently dis-
parate in the proper weight to be attached thereto, that a decision
will be relatively straightforward. However, this is frequently not the
case with respect to the litigation which reaches the Supreme Court.
The difficult issues are almost invariably resolved by a weighing or
balancing process, whether or not the individual Justices so acknowl-
edge, and not by such formulae as the oversimplified tautology that
183. See generally authorities cited note 95 supra.
184. Why, for example, may the federal government prohibit "bard-core pornog-
raphy" but not other forms of obscenity? The reply that this result is more con-
sistent with the letter and spirit of the first ammendment does not seem entirely
satisfactory. See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT.
REv. 1, 22-25.
185. See generally Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup.
CT. REv. 75; Nutting, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, 30 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 167
(1961).
186. The reference is to Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) and Lucas v. Forty-
fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) and their progeny, including Avery v.
County of Midland, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). See also McCollum v. Board of Education,
333 U.S. 203, 247 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting): "A rule of law should not be drawn




"no law" in the first amendment means "no law."187 The critical issue
in first amendment adjudication is not the interpretation of "no law,"
but rather the scope to be assigned to the phrase "the freedom of
speech." Exhaustive historical scholarship concludes that even the
framers of the first amendment had no clear idea as to what was
comprehended within "the freedom of speech."1' It is difficult, there-
fore, to understand those who insist that the first amendment speaks
with unmistakable clarity, even in its penumbral area.
Finally, several of Justice Harlan's opinions indicate quite clearly
that, even within the context of a general balancing approach, a
preferred status may be given to rights derived from the first amend-
ment. Thus, he has recognized explicitly a speech-conduct continuum,
with the area of legitimate governmental concern expanding in direct
proportion as the effect of the regulation reaches the conduct phase
and the effect upon speech becomes concomitantly more incidental.
Such an approach may encourage the proliferation of doctrine and
make hazy those bright lines of distinction which are attempted to
be drawn. Nevertheless, such an approach may be required when it
is necessary in the course of the case-by-case judicial process simul-
taneously to give effect to legitimate governmental interests, to
accommodate the needs of the federal system, to respect the limits
of judicial authority, and finally, to protect the constitutional immu-
nities of individual citizens.
187. If one is to be entirely consistent in a "literal" approach to the first amend-
ment, it would seem difficult to escape the conclusion that the amendment, in any
event, protects only against laws passed by Congress; for, after all, the plain words
are "Congress shall make no law ...."
188. See generally L. LEVY, FREEDoM OF SPEECH AN PRESS IN EARLY AmEmICAN
HISronY: LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960).
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